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THE UNRECOGNIZED RIGHT OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
TO ADMIT THEIR OWN PRETRIAL STATEMENTS
STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG*
DANIEL J. CAPRA**
In Agard v. Portuondo, the United States Supreme Court held that
a prosecutor did not violate a testifying defendant's constitutional
rights by inviting the jury to infer from the defendant's presence at
trial that the defendant altered his own version of events to accord
with other witnesses' testimony. Justice Scalia's opinion for the
Court emphasized that jurors might well draw the inference even
without a prosecutor asking them to do so. Although Agard is viewed
as giving an advantage in a criminal trial to the government, this
Article considers how Agard might be used to allow defense counsel
to introduce the prior consistent statements of defendants that
ordinarily could not be admitted under the rules of evidence. The
Article discusses some procedural implications of admitting a
defendant's pretrial statements-in response to the prosecution's
Agard argument, or simply in an effort to negate the possibility that
the jury will draw an inference on its own even if the prosecutor
makes no Agard argument. It concludes by examining the potential
effect that admission of prior consistent statements could have on
defense strategy at trial, and illustrates with some examples of what
defense counsel could do post-Agard to demonstrate that the
defendant's testimony was not the product of hearing the testimony
of government witnesses.
* Wallace and Beverley Woodbury University Professor of Law, George Washington
University Law School; Chair, ABA Section on Criminal Justice.
** Philip D. Reed Professor of Law, Fordham Law School; Reporter, Judicial Conference
Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules. We are grateful to Scott Roehm, J.D. 2007,
Fordham Law School, for his assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
On March 6, 2000, the United States Supreme Court decided
Portuondo v. Agard.1 The case did not receive much fanfare when
it was handed down, and it has largely been ignored by commenta-
tors, prosecutors, and defense counsel.2 When the case has been
considered, the issue generally has been whether a state court
should permit the same type of prosecutorial argument that the
Supreme Court permitted.3 Yet, we believe that the result in Agard
has important-and positive-implications for criminal defendants
and their counsel. This Article considers how Agard might be used
to allow the defense to introduce prior consistent statements of the
defendant-statements that ordinarily cannot be admitted under
the rules of evidence.
The Court in Agard held that the prosecutor did not violate the
testifying defendant's constitutional rights by inviting the jury to
draw an adverse inference from the defendant's presence at trial.4
Specifically, it was permissible for the prosecutor to point out that,
unlike all the other witnesses, the defendant was not sequestered
during trial. Consequently, the defendant had the opportunity to
hear all the trial testimony, and thereby to tailor his own testimony
to that of the witnesses who preceded him.
Although the defendant lost in Agard, this Article argues that the
Court's opinion opened a door for criminal defendants to introduce
evidence that had heretofore been excluded. The Court's rationale,
fairly applied, should allow a defendant, attacked with an Agard
argument, to introduce his own pretrial hearsay statements that
are consistent with his trial testimony. The Court allowed the
1. 529 U.S. 61 (2000).
2. The sparse commentary on the case includes William E. Hellerstein, "Shakin' and
Bakin"' The Supreme Court's Remarkable Criminal Law Rulings of the 1999 Term, 17 TOURO
L.REv. 163 (2000); John Owens, Comment, Portuondo v. Agard: Distinguishing Impeachment
of Credibility from the Act of Burdening a Defendant's Constitutional Rights, 78 DENV. U. L.
REV. 173 (2000); and Thomas Lundy, Jury Instruction Corner:Agard Agony, CHAMPION, July
2004, at 36.
3. Compare, e.g., State v. Alexander, 755 A.2d 868, 874 (Conn. 2000) (following the
Supreme Court), with State v. Daniels, 861 A.2d 808, 819 (N.J. 2004) (finding the
prosecutor's arguments improper and rejecting the Supreme Court's approach).
4. Agard, 529 U.S. at 73.
1993
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prosecutor to ask the jury to infer that the defendant had altered
his own version of events to accord with other witness testimony at
trial. It stands to reason that the defendant should be allowed to
rebut this inference by introducing statements he made before trial
that are consistent with his trial testimony.5
This Article discusses the opportunities for criminal defendants
presented by the Court's opinion in Agard. Part I reviews the
factual background of Agard and the rationale of the Supreme
Court's decision. Once it is clear how the Supreme Court views the
normal reactions of juries in criminal cases, the potential signifi-
cance of the Court's decision for defendants is evident. Part II
argues for admission of a particular type of statement that a
defendant could make pretrial and then offer at trial to blunt the
impact of the adverse inference raised by the prosecutor in Agard.
Part III considers some procedural implications of admitting
defendants' pretrial statements in response to the prosecution's
Agard argument. Part IV discusses the potential effect of admission
on defense strategy, and on the scope and timing of pretrial
discovery. Part V sets forth some trial examples that may arise in
light of Agard.
I. PORTUONDO V. AGARD: FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND SUPREME
COURT DECISION
A. Factual Background
Ray Agard met Nessa Winder and Breda Keegan on Friday, April
27, 1990, at a bar and night club in lower Manhattan.6 Both women
were then twenty-three years old.7 After socializing for some time,
Agard invited Winder back to his Queens apartment.8 She accepted,
and a consensual sexual relationship between Agard and Winder
5. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) (exempting prior consistent statements from the
hearsay rule when offered to rebut an express or implied charge against a declarant of recent
fabrication or improper motive); infra Part II.
6. Agard v. Portuondo, 117 F.3d 696, 698 (2d Cir. 1997), rev'd, 529 U.S. 61 (2000).
Citations in this section are to the Second Circuit's opinion in Agard v. Portuondo, which
presents the factual background of the case most fully.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 699.
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began early the next morning.' The extent, but not the existence, of
that relationship was contested at trial.
10
Agard, Winder, and Keegan reconvened the following weekend
at the same bar and night club." They were joined later that night
by two of Agard's friends-Freddy and Kiah.' 2 The group drank
and talked, and there was some use of cocaine, including use by
Winder.'" Sometime between 4:00 and 4:30 a.m., at Agard's sug-
gestion, they returned to his apartment.14 Kiah and Freddy left to
buy beer, while Agard, Keegan, and Winder retired to Agard's
bedroom. 15
At trial, these facts were largely, though not entirely, uncon-
tested. What occurred over the course of approximately the next
eight hours, however, was substantially in dispute. According to
Agard, upon returning to the apartment, Keegan became "loud" and
"agitated" about her desire to go home.' 6 He eventually escorted her
out to Kiah's car, returned, and fell asleep next to Winder." Agard
and Winder awoke several hours later and had consensual vaginal
intercourse before falling back to sleep and reawakening around
1:00 p.m.' 8 At that time, according to Agard, Winder was up-
set-her boyfriend was arriving from England and would be furious
if he discovered the relationship. 9 Agard attempted to calm her
down and an altercation ensued, during which she scratched his
face and he reflexively pushed her away.2" Agard then called a cab,
gave Winder $25, and sent her on her way.2'
Keegan and Winder told a different story. Keegan testified that
Agard responded to her requests to leave his apartment by pressing
9. Id.
10. Id. at 698.
11. Id. at 699.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 701.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See id. at 699, 701.
20. Id. at 701-02.
21. Id. at 702.
1995
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a loaded gun against her head.22 Agard assertedly warned Keegan
to be quiet and continued to threaten her as he vacillated between
ordering her out and demanding that she stay.23 Agard eventually
allowed Keegan to leave with Kiah.
2 4
Winder testified that she awoke at 9:30 a.m. on Sunday, May 6,
wearing only her "vest" and without any recollection of the previous
night's events.25 According to Winder, Agard expressed an interest
in sexual intercourse.26 She declined, however, indicating that she
was expecting her boyfriend from England.2" Agard became angry,
approached her from the back and slapped her in the face.2" He
continued to physically attack her before forcing her, at gunpoint,
to engage in oral sodomy.29 She screamed and struggled, but
eventually submitted-in the face of death threats-to repeated
acts of sodomy and rape.3 ° Finally, when for the second time Agard's
landlady phoned the apartment, Winder had an opportunity to
dress."' Agard then called a taxi to take her back to Brooklyn.32 He
escorted her downstairs, warning, "[D]on't dare call the police."33
Because Winder was short on money, the cab driver dropped her off
down the street from Agard's apartment where she was eventually
able to phone Keegan.3 4 Winder hid until Keegan came for her, and
the two women went to the police station.35 Winder was examined
later that day by Doctor Ardeshir Karimi at Elmhurst Hospital.36
Dr. Karimi did not see signs of abnormality or trauma in Winder's
vagina or anus.37
22. Id. at 700.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 700-01.
31. Id. at 701.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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On Monday, Winder and Keegan found the following message on
their apartment's answering machine: "You will know who this
message is for. After careful consideration of this entire situation,
it was my fault. I was a golden asshole. The only thing I can do is
say I'm sorry and that's it. I'll never bother you again. Live safely
and peacefully. Goodbye."3 Both women identified Agard's voice.39
The following day, a detective executed a search warrant at Agard's
home and recovered a .45 caliber automatic handgun and two
magazines containing shells.4 ° Agard was arrested and charged
with nineteen sodomy and sexual assault counts and three unlawful
firearms counts.4'
Agard's story was largely consistent with the complainants'
account about the first weekend after they met. He contended,
however, that he had consensual anal intercourse with Winder on
their first night together, as well as consensual intercourse on
Saturday night.42 Agard also testified that Winder found his gun in
the closet and tried on the holster.43
Agard's account of the second weekend, however, was markedly
different from that of the complainants. He testified that Winder
was awake and kissing and fondling him on the drive to the second
nightclub, and that she did not object to returning to his home in
Queens.44 As to Keegan, Agard stated that she was "loud" about her
desire to go home when they arrived at his apartment in Queens.45
Agard asserted that he complied with Keegan's demands and that,
as he brought her to Kiah's car, they passed his landlady who was
"upset" about the noise Keegan was making. 46 After sending Keegan
off, Agard returned to his room and went to sleep on his bed next to
Winder. 47 He testified that at this point it was about 6:00 a.m.4'
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 702.
42. Id. at 701.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
1997
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Agard testified that he and Winder awoke around 9:00 a.m. and
had consensual vaginal sex before falling asleep again; that they
woke again sometime between noon and 1:00 p.m., and at that
point Winder was "upset," "kind of hyper," and worried about the
possibility that her boyfriend would find out about her having sex
with Agard and would react violently.49 He also testified that he
tried to calm her down, approaching her from behind and taking
hold of her shoulders; that Winder reacted to his sincere attempt by
hitting him, taking hold of his lower lip and scratching him on the
inside of his mouth; that he reacted reflexively by using the palm of
his open hand to push her away, "mushing" her in the eye; and that
when the cab he had already called arrived, he gave Winder $25
and sent her on her way.5° Agard admitted that he was "annoyed"
about the trouble the women had caused him with his landlady,
but denied that he was "angry."'" The following day he called to
apologize to Winder for mushing her in the face.5
Kiah also testified for the defense, contradicting Keegan on
several points. He corroborated Agard's account that Winder
embraced and kissed Agard during the drive to the second club.5"
He also testified that Winder was talking and drinking at the
last bar, not asleep as Keegan recollected.5 4 Finally, he disputed
Keegan's assertion that she had told him that Agard threatened her
with a gun.55
B. Road to the Supreme Court
Agard was convicted at trial on two sexual assault counts, and on
two counts of third degree weapons possession.5" The trial judge
49. Id. at 701.
50. Id. at 701-02.
51. Id. at 702.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 702.
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dismissed one of the assault convictions57 as repugnant to the jury's
finding that no rape had occurred.5"
Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, claiming that the pros-
ecutor's summation violated Agard's constitutional rights. The
contested part of the summation was the following:
You know, ladies and gentlemen, unlike all the other wit-
nesses ... the defendant has a benefit and the benefit that he
has, unlike all the other witnesses, is he gets to sit here and
listen to the testimony of all the other witnesses before he
testifies.
[objection overruled]
That gives you a big advantage, doesn't it. You get to sit here
and think what am I going to say and how am I going to say it?
How am I going to fit it into the evidence?
[objection overruled]
He's a smart man. I never said he was stupid.... He used
everything to his advantage.5 9
The prosecutor's point was apparently that Agard was able to
explain things such as the voicemail he left, and his apparently
violent actions toward Winder, which he could not have done as
easily had he not heard the detailed accounts of the prosecution
witnesses. The prosecutor, however, did not specifically address
which of Agard's statements might have been tailored. The pros-
ecutor's argument was essentially a generic invitation to draw a
negative inference against Agard because he heard the prosecution
witnesses before he testified.
The trial judge denied the motion for mistrial, ruling that the
prosecutor's comments-inviting the jury to infer that Agard had
the unique opportunity to, and did in fact, tailor his testimony to fit
that of the witnesses who preceded him-did not unduly burden
Agard's constitutional right to be present at trial.6 °
On direct appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the sodomy
conviction and one of the weapons convictions, but reversed the
57. The dismissed conviction was for felony assault in which rape was the underlying
felony.
58. Agard, 117 F.3d at 702.
59. Id. at 707.
60. See id.
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second weapons conviction, because both charges were for the same
offense.61 The court did not address Agard's constitutional claim.
The New York Court of Appeals denied review without opinion.62
Agard sought habeas corpus relief in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York, but was denied in an
unpublished opinion.6
On appeal from denial of the habeas petition, a divided panel of
the Second Circuit reversed. 4 The court held that the prosecutor's
comments during summation violated the defendant's Fifth, Sixth,
and Fourteenth Amendment rights.65 According to the court, it was
constitutional error for a prosecutor to insinuate to the jury for
the first time during summation that the defendant's presence
in the courtroom at trial provided him with a unique opportu-
nity to tailor his testimony to match the evidence. Such com-
ments violate a criminal defendant's right to confrontation, his
right to testify on his own behalf, and his right to receive due
process and a fair trial.66
Judge Winter, writing in concurrence, noted the power of the
inference suggested by the prosecutor in a case that turned on
witness credibility. He observed that the case "turned on detailed
and conflicting versions of several events given by prosecution
witnesses and by the defendant."67 Thus, the prosecution's sugges-
tion to derive a negative inference from the defendant's presence at
trial amounted to a "powerful argument."6 Judge Winter also called
particular attention to the unfairness of the prosecutor's comments
given the defendant's inability to anticipate or rebut them:
Under New York law, absent a claim of recent fabrication,
appellant could not have introduced evidence of prior consistent
statements-that is, evidence that he had told the same story
even before witnessing the prosecution's case. So long as New
61. People v. Agard, 606 N.Y.S.2d 239, 240-41 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
62. People v. Agard, 635 N.E.2d 298, 298 (N.Y. 1994).
63. Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 64-65 (2000).
64. Agard, 117 F.3d at 698.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 709.
67. Id. at 715 (Winter, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 715-16.
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York prohibits criminal defendants from introducing prior
consistent statements to demonstrate that their version of
evidence was not fabricated after learning of the prosecution's
evidence, its prosecutors may not, in my view, argue that such
fabrication occurred.69
C. Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court granted certiorari7 ° to address specifically
whether it was constitutional for the prosecutor, during summation,
"to call the jury's attention to the fact that the defendant had the
opportunity to hear all other witnesses testify and to tailor his
testimony accordingly."'" In an opinion written by Justice Scalia,
the Court reversed the Second Circuit.72 Two Justices concurred in
the result; two Justices dissented."
1. The Majority Opinion
a. Distinguishing Griffin v. California
Justice Scalia agreed with the Second Circuit that credibility was
key at Agard's trial. He pointed out that the prosecutor attacked
Agard's credibility in several ways: "She stressed respondent's
interest in the outcome of the trial, his prior felony conviction, and
his prior bad acts. She argued that respondent was a 'smooth slick
character ... who had an answer for everything,' and that part of his
testimony 'sounded rehearsed."'74
Agard argued that the prosecutor's suggestion to draw a negative
inference from his presence at trial was analytically the same as a
prosecutor's suggestion to draw an inference from the defendant's
refusal to testify at trial.7 " He reasoned that the Court had barred
the latter inference in Griffin v. California," as a violation of the
69. Id, at 715 (internal citations omitted).
70. Portuondo v. Agard, 526 U.S. 1016 (1999).
71. Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 63 (2000).
72. See id. at 63, 75.
73. See id. at 62.
74. Id. at 63-64 (internal citation omitted).
75. Id. at 65.
76. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
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Fifth Amendment; therefore the Court should bar the former
inference, in this case as a violation of the defendant's constitu-
tional right to be present at trial. He argued that he was being
penalized for exercising that right in the same way that Griffin was
punished for exercising his right to remain silent." Justice Scalia,
however, found that the Griffin analogy was unpersuasive. He
noted that, although the Fifth Amendment prohibits the jury from
drawing an inference from the defendant's silence, there is no such
bar to drawing an inference from the defendant's presence at trial.7S
He explained as follows:
What we prohibited the prosecutor from urging the jury to do in
Griffin was something the jury is not permitted to do. The
defendant's right to hold the prosecution to proving its case
without his assistance is not to be impaired by the jury's
counting the defendant's silence at trial against him-and upon
request the court must instruct the jury to that effect. It is
reasonable enough to expect a jury to comply with that instruc-
tion since, as we observed in Griffin, the inference of guilt from
silence is not always "natural or irresistible." A defendant might
refuse to testify simply out of fear that he will be made to look
bad by clever counsel, or fear "that his prior convictions will
prejudice the jury." By contrast, it is natural and irresistible for
a jury, in evaluating the relative credibility of a defendant who
testifies last, to have in mind and weigh in the balance the fact
that he heard the testimony of all those who preceded him. It is
one thing (as Griffin requires) for the jury to evaluate all the
other evidence in the case without giving any effect to the
defendant's refusal to testify; it is something else (and quite
impossible) for the jury to evaluate the credibility of the defen-
dant's testimony while blotting out from its mind the fact that
before giving the testimony the defendant had been sitting there
listening to the other witnesses. Thus, the principle respondent
asks us to adopt here differs from what we adopted in Griffin in
one or the other of the following respects: It either prohibits
inviting the jury to do what the jury is perfectly entitled to do;
or it requires the jury to do what is practically impossible."9
77. Agard, 529 U.S. at 65-68.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 67-68 (internal citations omitted).
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b. The Reasonable Jury
In a footnote accompanying the above quote, Justice Scalia
reiterates "that inferring opportunity to tailor from presence is
inevitable, and prohibiting that inference (while simultaneously
asking the jury to evaluate the veracity of the defendant's testi-
mony) is demanding the impossible."8 In the same footnote, Justice
Scalia rejected the distinction between pointing out the opportunity
to tailor and actually making an accusation of tailoring, and con-
cluded that "[d]rawing the line between pointing out the availability
of the inference and inviting the inference would be neither useful
nor practicable."'"
c. Generic Versus Specific Comments
For the majority, it made no difference that the prosecutor's
argument was "generic" rather than based upon any specific
indication of tailoring.8 2 Justice Scalia dredged up the old case
of Reagan v. United States8 as support for the proposition that
generic arguments are acceptable. In Reagan, the trial judge
instructed the jury that "the deep personal interest which [the
defendant] may have in the result of the suit should be considered
... in weighing his evidence and in determining how far or to what
extent, if at all, it is worthy of credit."84 Comparing Reagan to the
facts of Agard, Justice Scalia found that in both cases the jury was
simply given "a consideration [it] was to have in mind when
assessing the defendant's credibility."85
80. Id. at 68 n.1.
81. Id.
82. See id. at 70-71.
83. 157 U.S. 301 (1895).
84. Agard, 529 U.S. at 71 (quoting Reagan, 157 U.S. at 304) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
85. Id.
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d. Cross-examination Versus Summation
The defendant in Agard tried to raise a distinction between an
argument made during cross-examination and one made in closing:
If the prosecutor had raised the tailoring argument on cross-
examination, the defense would have had an opportunity to address
and rebut it."6 According to Agard, it smacked of unfairness to
comment on the defendant's right to attend the trial without the
defendant having any right of reply."7 The Agard majority found it
irrelevant, however, that the prosecutor's comments were made
during summation rather than cross-examination. 8 Justice Scalia
noted that the defense often must predict what the prosecution will
say in closing argument, and accordingly must plan in advance for
the possibility of the prosecution raising an argument without a
right of reply. 9
Equally irrelevant for the majority was the fact that New York
law may have required the defendant to be present at trial.90
Justice Scalia wrote that "[t]here is ... no authority whatever for the
proposition that the impairment of credibility, if any, caused by
mandatory presence at trial violates due process.,9 '
2. Justice Stevens's Concurring Opinion
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Breyer joined, concurred only
in the judgment.92 Justice Stevens concluded that the prosecutor's
argument demeaned the truth-seeking function of the adversary
process, violated the respect for the defendant's individual dignity,
and ignored the presumption of innocence.9" He was not persuaded,
86. See id. at 71-72.
87. See id.
88. Id. at 72.
89. See id. at 72-73.
90. Justice Scalia cited People v. Aiken, 380 N.E.2d 272, 274 (N.Y. 1978), for the
proposition that a defendant may waive his right to be present at every stage of the
proceeding. See Agard, 529 U.S. at 75.
91. Agard, 529 U.S. at 75.
92. See id. at 76 (Stevens, J., concurring).
93. See id.
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however, that the error created the kind of fundamental unfairness
required in habeas corpus cases to set aside state convictions.94
3. Justice Ginsburg's Dissent
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Souter, dissented.95 She
maintained generally that "[t]he Court today transforms a defen-
dant's presence at trial from a Sixth Amendment right into an
automatic burden on his credibility,"96 and specifically that "[i]t is
no more possible to know whether Agard used his presence at trial
to figure out how to tell potent lies from the witness stand than it
is to know whether an accused who remains silent had no exculpa-
tory story to tell."9 Justice Ginsburg found the Court of Appeals'
approach to be "restrained and moderate,"9 and emphasized the
unfairness of prosecutorial comment on an accused's presence when
there was no evidence of tailoring and the defendant had no fair
chance to respond to the comment as he might have were he cross-
examined about an allegation of tailoring. 9
Justice Ginsburg did not dispute that a jury would be aware of a
defendant's presence at trial and of the opportunity of a defendant
to tailor testimony. 00 She concluded, however, that a jury was
likely in many or most cases to draw a natural or irresistible
inference of guilt from a defendant's failure to testify, and that a
jury might not be as likely to draw an inference of wrongful
tailoring from presence at trial as the majority suggested.0 1 Justice
Ginsburg also disputed the contention that a jury is entitled to
draw an inference of tailoring from presence, and thus that a
prosecutor could ask a jury to draw such an inference.'02 She argued
that even if a jury could draw such an inference on its own, it
94. See id.
95. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 77.
98. Id. at 78.
99. See id. at 78-80.
100. See id. at 86 & n.7.
101. See id. at 84-86.
102. See id. at 86.
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would not follow that prosecutors could urge juries to draw the
inference. 103
II. ADMISSIBILITY OF PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS OF AN
ACCUSED AFTER AGARD
According to the Agard majority, during summation, a prosecutor
is free to call the jury's attention to the defendant's unique opportu-
nity to hear the testimony of all the witnesses who preceded him
and to adapt his testimony accordingly. 104 A prosecutor is similarly
permitted to directly accuse the defendant of tailoring. 105 In neither
case do such comments unduly burden the exercise of a defendant's
federal constitutional rights notwithstanding a lack of any evidence
in the record that the defendant, in fact, changed his story.1"6 The
Court's decision, as explained above,10 7 rests on the premise that
criminal juries have a "natural and irresistible" tendency in
assessing a defendant's credibility to infer that he took advantage
of being the last witness to testify, even absent comment by the
prosecutor to that effect.10 8 Finally, and importantly, the Court
stresses that it is up to the defendant to anticipate the prosecutor's
closing argument and attempt to address it during the trial.' 9
Although Agard precludes criminal defendants from successfully
invoking the federal Constitution to block attacks of this nature, the
Court left open the logical next question: Should defendants be
permitted to respond? Under appropriate circumstances and with
proper evidence, we believe the answer is "yes"-especially given
the Agard majority's reliance on the well-established premise that
the accused will often have to act peremptorily in anticipation of
the prosecutor's closing argument. The proper evidence would be
103. See id. at 86-87.
104. See id. at 73 (majority opinion).
105. See id.
106. It is important to note that the Supreme Court's ruling does not preclude state courts
from prohibiting prosecutorial commentary of the sort at issue in Agard through a more
expansive interpretation of state constitutional protections. See, e.g., State v. Daniels, 861
A.2d 808, 819 (N.J. 2006) (rejecting the Supreme Court's approach and finding the
prosecutor's comments improper).
107. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
108. See Agard, 529 U.S. at 67-68.
109. See id. at 72-73.
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statements made by the defendant consistent with his in-court
testimony and made before his exposure to any statements or
testimony of the government's witnesses. This Article proceeds to
discuss the proper circumstances for use of prior consistent
statements to address the prosecutor's tailoring argument.
Suppose that Ray Agard had provided a pretrial statement in
which his version of the events at issue was spelled out in detail
and consistent with his trial testimony. Suppose as well that he
gave this statement before he ever heard the prosecution witnesses
testify and before he had any access to the statements given to the
police or the prosecutor by prosecution witnesses. Finally, suppose
that the statement was made to a lawyer and recorded in writing
or through other media, such as audio or video tape. The existence
of such a pretrial statement would not prove that Ray Agard was
innocent or that he was not lying both in the pretrial statement and
at trial. It would, however, totally negate the inference that he had
tailored his testimony as a result of being present when government
witnesses testified.
If the inference of tailoring is as powerful and inevitable as the
Court in Agard presumed, then defendants must have a right to
introduce, for purposes of rebuttal, pretrial statements of the sort
just described. When a prosecutor calls upon the jury to infer either
that the defendant tailored his testimony, or that the defendant
had the enticing opportunity to do so, Federal Rule of Evidence
80 1 (d) (1) (B) "'-fairly applied-should allow for admission of these
prior consistent statements."' However, when the prosecutor
makes no such accusation, express or implied, the Federal Rules of
Evidence might prove unduly narrow to accommodate what we
believe is a defendant's right, in making a defense, to offer evidence
to counter a damaging inference that criminal juries can appar-
ently be expected to draw. A defendant should also be allowed to
anticipate the possibility that the prosecutor might make the
tailoring argument, even if it turns out that no such argument is
made.
110. Throughout this Article, comments regarding the Federal Rules of Evidence are
applicable to the many state rules that are substantively identical.
111. For the procedural implications of permitting introduction of rebuttal evidence at
summation, see infra Part III.
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A. Admission of Defendants'Pretrial Statements Following an
Attack: Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B)
A defendant who has made a pretrial statement that later proves
consistent with his in-court testimony cannot benefit from having
done so absent a vehicle for introducing his statement to the jury.
The pretrial statement would be hearsay, even though the declarant
is a witness at the trial.112 In cases, however, where the prosecutor
points to the defendant's courtroom presence to raise an inference
of tailoring, Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) can and should
serve as that vehicle.
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) admits for their truth prior statements of a
testifying witness that would otherwise be excluded as hearsay
when those statements are consistent with the witness's in-court
testimony and "offered to rebut an express or implied charge
against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or
motive." '113 To qualify a prior consistent statement as nonhearsay
under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), four criteria must be satisfied.14 First, the
proponent of the statement must testify at trial and be subject to
cross-examination. 115 Second, the declarant must be impeached by
a charge that his testimony was a recent fabrication or was infected
by improper influence or motive." 6 The impeaching attack can take
the form of either an express charge"' (e.g., directly accusing the
witness of lying), or an implied charge"' (e.g., relying on innuendo
112. See 4 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, MICHAEL M. MARTIN & DANIEL J. CAPRA, FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 801.02[1][d] (9th ed. 2006) ("[S]tatements that are recounted
on the witness stand by the declarant who made them, i.e., prior statements of testifying
witnesses, are also within the definition of hearsay.").
113. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) (stating that a statement is not hearsay if "the declarant
testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement,
and the statement is ... consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an
express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence
or motive").
114. See, e.g., United States v. Collicott, 92 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 1996).
115. FED. R. EID. 801(d)(1)(B).
116. Id.
117. See Arizona v. Johnson, 351 F.3d 988, 998 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding admission under
Rule 802(d)(1)(B) of a victim's pretrial statements-recounted by testifying witness--that sex
with the defendant was not consensual, offered to rebut the defendant's charge that the
victim lied to avoid deportation).
118. See, e.g., United States v. Stoeker, 215 F.3d 788, 791 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that
cross-examination concerning a witness's plea agreement suggested an incentive to testify
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to suggest that the witness's testimony was improperly motivated).
Third, the prior statement must be consistent with the declarant's
challenged in-court testimony.11 9 Fourth, the statement must have
been made before the alleged motive to falsify arose.12 °
The first and third criteria would necessarily be satisfied in any
case where a defendant records his version of events pretrial and
then seeks to admit that statement to rebut an eleventh-hour
charge that he changed his story to fit the testimony of witnesses
who came before him. Only if the defendant testifies can he be
attacked by the prosecution for tailoring his testimony or for having
had the alluring opportunity to do so. Additionally, only if the prior
statement is consistent with the defendant's in-court testimony
would it have any advantageous probative value (i.e., by negating
the inference of tailoring and thereby bolstering the defendant's
veracity).
The second criterion can be met by a range of prosecutorial
conduct, though that range is delimited by the text of the rule. Only
certain forms of impeachment--express or implied charges of recent
fabrication, improper influence, or motive-trigger the exception.' 2
A direct accusation that the defendant changed his testimony after
hearing that of other witnesses is clearly an express charge of
recent fabrication and-no matter when it was made-should open
the door to admission by the defendant of any qualifying prior
consistent statements. So too, in light of Agard, should a prosecu-
tor's express comment that the defendant had an opportunity to
tailor his testimony. The prosecutor's closing arguments in State v.
Hart provide a helpful example: "After all, the defendant is the only
falsely and constituted an implied charge under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) that the witness altered
his testimony to curry favor with the government for sentencing purposes).
119. See, e.g., United States v. Vest, 842 F.2d 1319, 1329 (1st Cir.. 1988) (noting that Rule
801(d)(1)(B) does not require the prior statement to be identical in every detail to trial
testimony). However, the closer a defendant's pretrial statement tracks his in-court
testimony, the more persuasive his rebuttal to a charge that he changed his story.
120. See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 158 (1995) (holding that only a consistent
statement that "predates the motive [to falsify] is a square rebuttal of the charge that the
testimony was contrived as a consequence of that motive").
121. A prior consistent statement offered simply to bolster the general veracity of a
witness is inadmissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B). See, e.g., United States v. Bishop, 264 F.3d
535, 548 (5th Cir. 2001) ("Rule 801(d)(1)(B) cannot be construed to allow the admission of
what would otherwise be hearsay every time a law enforcement officer's credibility or
memory is challenged ....").
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one who was allowed to sit through the testimony of every other
witness before he got up to testify and, I suggest, had an opportu-
nity to fabricate his testimony based on what the other witnesses
said. 122 In Hart, the prosecutor did not directly accuse the defen-
dant of changing his story to fit the testimony of the government's
witnesses. However, according to Justice Scalia in Agard, explicitly
pointing out the opportunity to tailor rather than charging tailoring
in fact is a distinction without a difference.'23 Indeed, if drawing the
line between these two modes of impeachment is "neither useful
nor practicable" in assessing the constitutional implications of a
prosecutor's comments,12 ' both modes should qualify as express
charges of recent fabrication for purposes of determining whether
defendants can take advantage of Rule 801(d)(1)(B).
The Rule's impeachment requirement is equally satisfied by an
implied charge of recent fabrication, improper influence, or im-
proper motive-one that relies on suggestion or innuendo. 2 ' The
prosecutor's comments at summation in Agard provide a good
example of such a charge. By saying that the defendant craftily
"used everything to his advantage" and got to sit at trial and
"think what I am going to say and how am I going to say it?,"'26
the prosecutor clearly intended to imply that the defendant
changed his version of events during the trial to align with the story
told by the government's witnesses. That the prosecutor avoided
directly accusing the defendant of tailoring is of no moment-
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) treats this kind of commentary as an attack
and permits admission of prior consistent statements that satisfy
the Rule's remaining criteria.
Finally, for a defendant's pretrial statement to qualify as
admissible nonhearsay, the statement must be made before the
122. 15 P.3d 917, 924 46 (Mont. 2000); see also State v. Daniels, 861 A.2d 808, 812 (N.J.
2004) ("[T]he defendant sits with counsel, listens to the entire case and he listens to each one
of the State's witness[es], he knows what facts he can't get past .... [H]e can choose to craft
his version to accommodate those facts." (emphasis omitted)).
123. See Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 68 n.1 (2000) ('Drawing the line between
pointing out the availability of the inference and inviting the inference would be neither
useful or practicable.").
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., United States v. Arias-Santana, 964 F.2d 1262 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that
the prior consistent statement was admissible to rebut an implied charge of recent
fabrication).
126. Agard v. Portuondo, 117 F.3d 696, 707 (2d Cir. 1997).
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alleged motive to falsify arose.127 The logic behind this criterion is
most easily demonstrated through a simple hypothetical: Suppose
an uncharged co-conspirator testifying in a criminal trial is
impeached by a defense attorney's claim that the witness is lying to
curry favor with the government. A statement that the witness
made before trial, but after his own arrest and decision to cooperate
with the prosecution, is infected by the same source of potential
bias as his trial testimony and is equally likely to be a fabrication. 121
The statement therefore is of no value in refuting the defense
attorney's charge because it does not tend to prove that the alleged
motive to fabricate had no effect. By contrast, a statement made by
the witness to a trusted friend before the witness's arrest-and
consistent with his subsequent testimony-might demonstrate
forcefully that the witness is telling the truth at trial. It shows that
the witness made the same statement before the motive to falsify
arose, and therefore the motive to falsify did not affect the trial
testimony.
When a defendant is accused of adapting his version of events to
fit that of the witnesses who preceded him, the source of the alleged
fabrication is exposure to the statements of those other witnesses.
After all, a defendant cannot tailor his testimony until he has
something to tailor it to. A statement by a defendant before trial
-and before he has access to any statements of prosecution
witnesses that might be compelled through discovery or disclosed
to the defendant in some other manner-is necessarily made before
either the motive or the opportunity to falsify comes to pass.
For defendants who, before they have access to witness tes-
timony, make a pretrial statement that tracks their subsequent
trial testimony, Rule 801(d)(1)(B) should be construed to allow
them to admit that statement into evidence to rebut a last minute
charge of tailoring. 129 However, even so construed, the Rule remains
127. See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 158 (1995).
128. See, e.g., United States v. Awon, 135 F.3d 96 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that it was error
to admit consistent statements of prosecution witnesses under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), where the
witnesses were impeached on the ground that they were seeking leniency, and consistent
statements were made only after the witnesses were informed that the police were aware of
their criminal activity and informed that they could benefit from cooperating).
129. See infra Part III for a discussion about the procedure under which such statements
should be admitted.
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underinclusive given the force and scope of the inference as
described by Justice Scalia in Agard."3 °
B. Admission of Defendants'Pretrial Statements Absent an Attack
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) conditions admission of a defendant's prior
consistent statement on his opponent opening the door through
an attempt to impeach. Thus, a defendant who has not been so
attacked, but nonetheless fears that the jury will draw an adverse
inference from his courtroom presence, is not able to invoke the
Rule to admit the consistent statement. Indeed, a narrow interpre-
tation of the admissibility of relevant evidence under the Federal
Rules of Evidence would leave such a defendant without effective
recourse.' If, however, as Justice Scalia argued in Agard, criminal
juries can and will infer that a defendant used his courtroom
presence to tailor his testimony notwithstanding the content of the
prosecutor's summation, we believe that courts should be open to
permitting defendants to introduce prior consistent statements of
the sort discussed here even absent an attack. The Constitution
guarantees criminal defendants "a meaningful opportunity to
present a complete defense."'32 Whether that right emanates from
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or from the
Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amend-
ment, it requires that criminal defendants be afforded "a fair
opportunity to defend against the State's accusations" through the
presentation of relevant, probative evidence."13 Surely that right is
130. See discussion supra Part I.
131. Prior consistent statements are also generally inadmissible for rehabilitation
purposes absent at least some impeaching attack. See FED. R. EVID. 608(a)(2) ("[Elvidence
of truthful character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has
been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise."); see also United States v.
Bolick, 917 F.2d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 1990) ("[The requirement that impeachment must
precede rehabilitation should surprise no one. For how can one rehabilitate what has not yet
been discredited?").
132. California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479,485 (1984) (affirming a defendant's due process
right to be afforded meaningful opportunity to present a full and fair defense); see also Crane
v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 691 (1986) (holding that the petitioner was deprived of the
fundamental right to fair opportunity to present a defense where the court excluded
testimony concerning circumstances of the petitioner's confession).
133. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973) (holding that the denial of
defendant's motion to treat a witness-who had confessed to the murder for which the
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broad enough to permit a defendant-with relevant, probative
evidence-to negate an inference that a jury otherwise would be
permitted to draw, especially when the inference is as powerful as
Justice Scalia describes it in Agard.134 Both a fair construction of
the relevancy rules, as well as equal application of Justice Scalia's
reasoning in Agard, support that very proposition.
Relevant evidence is that which tends to make any fact of
consequence to the determination of an action more or less likely." 5
In cases that turn on witness credibility, a defendant's pretrial
statement demonstrating his testimonial consistency is therefore
highly relevant to rebut the jury's negative inference from the
defendant's presence throughout the trial. Pursuant to Rule 402, all
relevant evidence is admissible unless otherwise proscribed." 6
Although Rule 801(d)(1)(B) and the common law rules on rehabilita-
tion generally require impeachment before permitting introduction
of a witness's prior consistent statements, there is no applicable
rule or statute that explicitly bars rebuttal evidence of the type
discussed here.137 The logic behind the impeachment requirement
is that, in the absence of an attack, the defendant's credibility has
not been challenged and therefore does not need rehabilitating.
However, if, as Justice Scalia argues, criminal juries inevitably
draw the powerful adverse inference that defendants might have
used their courtroom presence to tailor their testimony,"' then no
attack is required to impugn those defendants' credibility. In turn,
allowing defendants to offer prior consistent statements to rebut
that inference (i.e., to repair their credibility) is consistent with the
spirit and purpose of the rehabilitation rules.
Of course, prior consistent statements offered to address a
negative inference in the absence of impeachment by the adversary
defendant was on trial-as adverse, and the exclusion of testimony of three other witnesses
to whom former witness had repeated confession, deprived defendant of his constitutional
right to an effective defense); see also Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006) (holding
that arbitrary exclusion of critical exculpatory evidence violates the accused's constitutional
right to an effective defense).
134. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
135. See FED. R. EVID. 401.
136. FED. R. EVID. 402.
137. See FED. R. EVID. 807 (stating a residual exception to hearsay rules, allowing
introduction of evidence with "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness").
138. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
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cannot be admitted for their truth, unless they fit a hearsay
exception. The hearsay exception provided under Rule 801(d)(1)(B)
would be inapplicable for reasons just discussed. However, if the
consistent statement is admitted simply to repair the defendant's
credibility in response to a negative inference, the hearsay rule is
inapplicable because such a statement is not admitted for its truth.
As the court stated in United States v. Harris, the admissibility
requirements of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) "need not be met to admit into
evidence consistent statements which are offered solely to rehabili-
tate a witness rather than as evidence of the matters asserted in
those statements." '139 If the consistent statement is offered only to
rehabilitate the defendant's credibility, the prosecution could ask
that the jury be so instructed. Substantive admissibility, however,
should not be of particular concern to defendants who are really
after demonstrating testimonial consistency. 40
As the hearsay rule is no bar to consistent statements offered to
repair the damage to credibility from a negative inference drawn
even in the absence of a tailoring argument, we are left with
relevance. Justice Scalia's analysis in Agard essentially closes out
any argument that the defendant's consistent statements are
139. 761 F.2d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 1985); see also United States v. Brennan, 798 F.2d 581,
587-88 (2d Cir. 1986) ('[P]rior consistent statements may be admissible for rehabilitation
even if not admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B)."). The end result under our analysis is that
if the prosecutor makes a tailoring argument, the prior consistent statement is admissible
both to rehabilitate the defendant's credibility and as substantive evidence; if no tailoring
argument is made, the prior consistent statement is admissible only for rehabilitating
credibility.
140. For an argument that the distinction between substantive and rehabilitative use of
prior consistent statements is meaningless, see Frank W. Bullock, Jr. & Steven Gardner,
Prior Consistent Statements and the Premotive Rule, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 509, 540 (1997)
(noting these are distinctions "without practical meaning"). See also United States v.
Simonelli, 237 F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2001) ("[The line between substantive use of prior
statements and their use to buttress credibility on rehabilitation is one which lawyers and
judges draw but which may well be meaningless to jurors.").
Although the distinction between substantive and rehabilitative use of prior consistent
statements is probably meaningless as a practical matter, it is a distinction made necessary
by the limitations (in the nature of admissibility requirements) of Rule 801(d)(1)(B). Thus,
our analysis is in response to the structure and limitations of that Rule.
If, in the absence of a tailoring charge, defense counsel thought it critical to have his
client's pretrial statement admitted for its truth, he might argue that a statement that
proves inadmissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) solely for lack of impeachment ought to be
admitted as a near miss to that Rule under the'residual exception. See FED. R. EVID. 807.
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irrelevant in this context.141 If the inference that criminal defen-
dants use their courtroom presence to tailor their testimony is as
commonplace as Justice Scalia contends, then a consistent state-
ment made before access to any statements of the trial witness is
obviously relevant because it rebuts the inference by showing that
the defendant's presence at trial did not affect his testimony. In
fact, no evidence is more probative on the question of tailoring
than a defendant's pretrial statement-made before access to
witness statements-that aligns closely with his subsequent trial
testimony. Thus, defendants should not be barred from negating
the negative inference by a prosecutor's decision to forego remind-
ing jurors of that which they will consider regardless.
The Court's analysis in Old Chief v. United States'42 lends strong
support to our argument that the defendant should be allowed to
rebut a negative inference that could be drawn by the jury even in
the absence of prosecutorial argument on the point. In Old Chief,
the defendant was charged with possessing a firearm after having
previously been convicted of a felony. 4 ' The Court required the
prosecution to accept the defendant's stipulation to the prior felony
conviction in lieu of allowing the prosecution to prove the same to
the jury by introducing the nature of and circumstances sur-
rounding the conviction through presentation of the indictment. 144
The Court reasoned that in light of a less prejudicial evidentiary
alternative (i.e., the stipulation), Rule 403 forbade the government
from explaining to the jury the defendant's prior bad acts, which the
jury might have used unfairly as propensity evidence to convict the
defendant for crimes other than those charged. 145 Up to this point,
Old Chief says little about the defendant's options in response to
negative inferences drawn by the jury in the absence of prosecuto-
141. See discussion supra Part I.C.1.
142. 519 U.S. 172 (1997).
143. Id. at 174.
144. Id. at 178.
145. Id. at 180 ("The term 'unfair prejudice,' as to a criminal defendant, speaks to the
capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on
a ground different from proof specific to the offense charged."). Rule 403 allows for the
exclusion of relevant evidence when the probative value of that evidence is substantially
outweighed by its prejudicial effect (i.e., the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence). FED. R. EVID. 403.
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rial argument. The Court went further in Old Chief,1 46 however, and
took pains to characterize and develop the more general rule as one
that permits the prosecution to make its case with the evidence of
its choice, in order to counter possible negative inferences that the
jury might draw from a stipulation:
But there is something even more to the prosecution's interest
in resisting efforts to replace the evidence of its choice with
admissions and stipulations, for beyond the power of conven-
tional evidence to support allegations and give life to the moral
underpinnings of law's claims, there lies the need for evidence
in all its particularity to satisfy the jurors' expectations about
what proper proof should be. Some such demands they bring
with them to the courthouse, assuming, for example, that a
charge of using a firearm to commit an offense will be proven by
introducing a gun in evidence. A prosecutor who fails to produce
one, or some good reason for his failure, has something to be
concerned about. "If [jurors'] expectations are not satisfied,
triers of fact may penalize the party who disappoints them by
drawing a negative inference against that party." Saltzburg, A
Special Aspect of Relevance: Countering Negative Inferences
Associated with the Absence of Evidence, 66 Calif. L. Rev. 1011,
1019 (1978) (footnotes omitted). Expectations may also arise in
jurors' minds simply from the experience of a trial itself. The use
of witnesses to describe a train of events naturally related can
raise the prospect of learning about every ingredient of that
natural sequence the same way. If suddenly the prosecution
presents some occurrence in the series differently, as by
announcing a stipulation or admission, the effect may be like
saying, "never mind what's behind the door," and jurors may
well wonder what they are being kept from knowing. A party
146. The Court found that it was an abuse of discretion under Rule 403 for a district judge
to refuse the defendant's offer to stipulate to the fact of a prior conviction, and to allow the
prosecution to admit the full record of that judgment, "when the purpose of the evidence is
solely to prove the element of prior conviction." Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 174. Old Chief has
been read to require the prosecution to accept a defense stipulation in lieu of presenting
relevant, probative evidence only in cases involving a predicate conviction and where the
stipulation is to the fact of that conviction (e.g., cases brought under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)
(2006)). See United States v. Crowder, 141 F.3d 1202, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (noting
that Old Chief distinguished between "stipulations to the status element of a crime, which
can be forced upon the prosecution, and stipulations to other elements of a crime, which the
prosecution should remain free to reject" (quoting 1 STEPHENA. SALTZBURG ETAL., FEDERAL
RuLEs OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 385 (7th ed. 1998))).
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seemingly responsible for cloaking something has reason for
apprehension, and the prosecution with its burden of proof may
prudently demur at a defense request to interrupt the flow of
evidence telling the story in the usual way."'
The Court's conclusion-that evidence offered to counter jury
inferences is relevant even if those inferences are not raised by the
adversary-has regularly held sway where a party has sought to
stipulate its way around the introduction of evidence that bears on
witness credibility. Even when defense counsel provides assurances
ex ante that she will refrain entirely from attempting to impeach a
testifying witness, courts have nonetheless permitted the prosecu-
tion to introduce credibility evidence that paints a clearer and more
compelling picture for the jury-a picture that addresses negative
inferences that could be drawn by the jury even in the absence of an
attack by the adversary.
The leading example is United States v. Universal Rehabilitation
Services, Inc., in which the government, on the direct examination
of a cooperating witness, sought to introduce the guilty plea
agreement of that witness.148 It is well established that the guilty
plea of a cooperating witness cannot be offered to prove that the
defendant himself is guilty.'49 Prosecutors generally argue that the
guilty plea should be admissible on direct not to prove the guilt of
the defendant, but because the defendant will introduce the
witness's guilty plea on cross-examination, and the government will
suffer a negative inference if it does not anticipate that cross-
examination by introducing the agreement on direct. This argument
has been accepted by the courts because the prosecution does
indeed suffer the risk that the jury will think it is hiding something
that is critical to the credibility of its witness, unless it is brought
out on direct.'5 °
In Universal Rehabilitation, however, the defendant sought to
counter this typical prosecutorial argument by promising the pros-
147. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 188-89.
148. 205 F.3d 657, 662 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc).
149. See, e.g., Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Mujahid, 990 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding
that the guilty plea of a cooperating witness must be excluded under Rule 403 if it is offered
only to prove that the defendant is guilty).
150. For a discussion on the need to "remove the sting" of anticipated impeachment, see
Wilson v. Williams, 182 F.3d 562, 574 (7th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
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ecution that defense counsel would not use the guilty pleas of two
cooperating witnesses to challenge the credibility of those wit-
nesses.'51 The defendant claimed that his promise to refrain from
impeachment of the witnesses rendered the introduction of their
guilty pleas irrelevant to anticipate any impeachment. 152 But the
court disagreed. It noted that the jury could draw negative infer-
ences about the prosecution if neither side brought out the guilty
plea agreements.'53 The plea agreements remained probative "to
eliminate any concern that the jury may harbor concerning whether
the government has selectively prosecuted the defendant."'154 The
court explained concern over jurors drawing inferences in the
following passage:
When a co-conspirator testifies he took part in the crime with
which the defendant is charged, his credibility will automati-
cally be implicated. Questions will arise in the minds of the
jurors whether the co-conspirator is being prosecuted, why he is
testifying, and what he may be getting in return. If jurors know
the terms of the plea agreement, these questions will be set to
rest and they will be able to evaluate the declarant's motives
and credibility.... [Ain attack is not always necessary.'55
Thus, as in Old Chief, the Universal Rehabilitation court reasoned
that Rule 403 permits a party to introduce evidence that will
counter a negative inference that may be drawn by a jury even
though the adversary never raises such an inference. Both courts
recognized what Justice Scalia emphasized in Agard-that juries
will draw inferences other than those specifically raised by the
proffered evidence. Both courts recognized that in light of this
reality, the evidence rules must be construed to permit the parties
to counter the predictable inferences drawn by jurors by introducing
evidence that is probative to counter those inferences.
Fairly applied, both Old Chief and Universal Rehabilitation
support the right of a criminal defendant to introduce a prior
statement that demonstrates his testimonial consistency even
151. Universal Rehab., 205 F.3d at 662 & n.6.
152. Id. at 666.
153. Id. at 667.
154. Id. at 665.
155. Id. at 666 (quoting United States v. Gaev, 24 F.3d 473, 477 (3d Cir. 1994)).
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absent a charge of tailoring by the prosecution. Those cases stand
for the proposition that a party may not be deprived of the opportu-
nity to counter probable inference-drawing by the jury simply
because the adversary chose not to raise the inference. Although
Old Chief and Universal Rehabilitation both concerned the ability
of the prosecution to fully present its case, the proposition must
apply equally to defendants. Both parties should have the right to
counter inferences drawn by the jury, regardless of whether those
inferences are raised by the jury. If anything, the defendant should
have a greater right to counter those inferences, as it is the
defendant who has a constitutional right to an effective defense.
Moreover, although the prosecution carries the burden of proof, the
defendant has a fundamental right to be afforded a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense.' 56
A prosecutor's decision not to draw an inference of tailoring at
summation is the functional equivalent of a stipulation to that
effect ex ante and looks very much like defense counsel's attempt in
Universal Rehabilitation to avoid introduction of the witnesses'
guilty pleas by promising to forego impeachment. Yet the prosecu-
tion in Universal Rehabilitation was permitted to introduce the
witnesses' guilty pleas, defense counsel's offer notwithstanding,
because the probative value of the plea agreements to forestall juror
speculation was not substantially outweighed by the risk that the
jury would use the agreements as proof of the defendants' guilt. 157
Just as "[q]uestions will arise in the minds of jurors" when appar-
ently uncharged co-conspirators testify to their participation in the
crime with which a defendant is charged,' so too, according to
Justice Scalia in Agard, will uninvited questions about tailoring
arise in the minds of jurors who know that a defendant has been
present in the courtroom throughout the testimony of prior
witnesses.'59 In the former case, introduction of the terms of the
witnesses' plea agreements puts those questions to rest. 6 ° In the
156. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
157. Universal Rehab., 205 F.3d at 669.
158. See id. at 666 (quoting Gaev, 24 F.3d at 477).
159. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
160. Universal Rehab., 205 F.3d at 666 ("If jurors know the terms of the plea agreement,
these questions will be set to rest and they will be able to evaluate the declarant's motives
and credibility." (quoting Gaev, 24 F.3d at 477)).
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latter, a defendant's pretrial statement demonstrating his testimo-
nial consistency does the same. In both cases, the "evidentiary
account" of what a witness "has thought and done" provides jurors
with the information necessary to reach an "honest" and "morally
reasonable" verdict.'6 ' In neither case should the admission of
relevant, probative evidence depend upon a preceding attack.
The Court's opinions on drawing inferences from pre-Miranda
silence lend further support to the notion that defendants should be
permitted to rebut an inference about tailoring through the use of
consistent statements made before trial. In Jenkins v. Anderson,
the Court held that a defendant who testifies at trial can be
questioned about his failure to come forward with an explanation
of innocence prior to being arrested.'62 Additionally, in Fletcher v.
Weir, the Court held that a negative inference could be drawn
permissibly from the defendant's silence after he was arrested
but before he received Miranda warnings.' 6 3 These cases strongly
support the notion that whether a defendant made a pretrial
statement has probative value for a jury determining the credibility
of the defendant's trial testimony. The Court's holding in Doyle v.
Ohio-that a defendant's silence after receiving Miranda warnings
cannot be used as impeachment evidence 64 -is entirely consistent
with the reasoning of Jenkins and Fletcher. The Doyle Court con-
cluded that it would be unfair to warn a defendant of a right to
remain silent and then use silence against the defendant, not that
silence might be without probative value.
Just as a defendant's silence might be probative of trial testi-
mony, a defendant's pretrial statement laying out a scenario that
is consistent with trial testimony might be powerful evidence that
the government's witnesses had no impact on the defendant's
161. See Todd E. Pettys, Evidentiary Relevance, Morally Reasonable Verdicts, and Jury
Nullification, 86 IOWAL. REv. 467,480, 507 (2001) ("Is only the Government entitled to have
the probative weight of its evidence enhanced (and the likelihood of admission thus
increased) due to its capacity to establish a moral proposition, or may a defendant similarly
demand that the probative value of her evidence be accorded a moral enhancement? ... [O]ne
commentator has asserted that it is a 'perfectly natural implication of Old Chiefs logic' to
conclude that moral enhancements must be distributed even-handedly." (citing James J.
Duane, Screw Your Courage to the Sticking-Place: The Roles of Evidence, Stipulations, and
Jury Instructions in Criminal Verdicts, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 463, 468-69 (1998))).
162. 447 U.S. 231, 240-41 (1980).
163. 455 U.S. 603, 603 (1982).
164. 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976).
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testimony and that the defendant's knowledge was unaffected by
being present at trial.16
C. The Instruction Alternative
An alternative that might be considered to permitting a defen-
dant to offer a pretrial statement is to have the judge instruct the
jury that it may not use the defendant's presence at trial to draw an
inference that the defendant tailored testimony to meet that of
government witnesses. Instructions similar in nature-for example,
that the defendant's silence at trial may not be counted against
him-are routinely provided at a defendant's request. There are
three problems with the instruction alternative as applied to cases
like Agard: First, according to the Agard majority, criminal juries
are "perfectly entitled," when assessing the defendant's credibility,
"to have in mind and weigh in the balance the fact that [the
defendant] heard the testimony of all those who preceded him."16
Thus, an instruction not to draw the inference of tailoring is
unjustified, as the jury is permitted to draw it-unlike an inference
from silence at trial, which the jury is forbidden to draw.
Second, an instruction may do more harm than good. It calls
attention to the defendant's opportunity to tailor which, notwith-
standing the characterization of criminal jury reactions in Agard,
might go unnoticed by jurors in at least some cases.6 7 It fails to
165. As Justice Scalia noted, colonial-era defendants were routinely asked to make pretrial
statements to a justice of the peace (so-called "accused speaks" trials). See Portuondo v.
Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 66 (2000). He further pointed out that defendants typically spoke and
conducted a defense personally, without counsel, and that if a defendant's statements at trial
varied from his pretrial statement, the contradiction could be noted. Id. The Justices'
manuals, which set out the colonial-era criminal procedure followed by justices of the peace,
also admonished that evidence favorable to the defendant elicited during pretrial
examination be received (and preserved for use at trial). See JuLIus GOEBEL, JR. & T.
RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK: A STUDY IN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE (1664-1776), at 633 (1944). Presumably, if the defendant told the same storyboth
during pretrial examination and at trial, his consistency could also be noted.
166. Agard, 529 U.S. at 67-68.
167. See Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research
on Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 622, 666-67 (2001) (finding that
cautionary instructions may emphasize the very matter that the instruction asks the jury
to discount). Defense counsel are well aware of the possibility that a limiting instruction can
serve as an invitation, and for that reason may ask that a judge not instruct a jury on
matters such as the defendant's right not to testify. Although it is not constitutional error
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explain to the jury why it is barred from drawing the inference. It
denies the defendant the opportunity to demonstrate that no
tailoring, in fact, occurred. Indeed, an instruction on tailoring might
be perceived by jurors as an arbitrary mechanism for protecting the
defendant and lead any number of them to draw the very inference
against which the instruction is intended to protect.
Third, although some argue that a jury instruction is deemed
sufficient to safeguard a defendant's constitutional rights, particu-
larly his decision not to testify at trial, that argument fails to
recognize its context-specificity. There are no adequate alternatives
for protecting the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. In cases like Agard, courts are not similarly
hamstrung. If whether to draw an inference of tailoring from
presence is the prerogative of jurors themselves, then evidence on
that point is critical, and a pretrial statement may be the most
powerful form of evidence to negate that inference. 6 '
We note that in Universal Rehabilitation, the majority rejected
the argument of the dissenting judges that a limiting instruction
was sufficient to remedy the prosecution's concern that the jury
would draw a negative inference about selective prosecution if they
were not informed of the guilty pleas.'69 The majority did not even
consider the alternative of an instruction worthy of argument.
Similarly, courts have rejected the argument that evidence of the
defendant's uncharged misconduct, when probative of intent, is
admissible over the defendant's offer to have the jury instructed
that he intended the crime. Again, the courts do not see an instruc-
tion as an effective alternative to the presentation of evidence." 0 If
for a trial judge to give an instruction over a defendant's objection, the Supreme Court has
recognized that the better practice may be for judges to bow to the defendant's preference.
See Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 340 (1978) ("It may be wise for a trial judge not to give
such a cautionary instruction over a defendant's objection. And each State is, of course, free
to forbid its trial judges from doing so as a matter of state law.").
168. See supra notes 147-55 and accompanying text.
169. United States v. Universal Rehab. Svcs., Inc., 205 F.3d 657, 685 (3d Cir. 2000)
(Becker, J., dissenting) ('CThe District Court could have instructed the jury that it should not
concern itself with selective prosecution or what the co-conspirators were promised in return
for their testimony.").
170. See, e.g., United States v. Crowder, 141 F.3d 1202, 1210-11 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc)
(rejecting the suggestion of Judge Tatel, in dissent, that an instruction on intent was a
proper alternative to the presentation of evidence of intent).
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the prosecution needs evidence instead of an instruction, the
defendant does as well.
III. PROCEDURAL IMPLICATIONS OF ADMITTING DEFENDANTS'
PRETRIAL STATEMENTS AT SUMMATION
This Article has just made the case for allowing the accused to
admit prior consistent statements to address the jury's inference
about tailoring, even though the prosecution raises no such
inference. Under our proposal, these prior consistent statements
would be admissible either during or after the accused's testimony.
Some defendants and their counsel, however, may wish to forego
the opportunity to admit prior consistent statements to address the
inference of tailoring. They may see a risk in addressing an
inference that the jury may not in fact draw under the particular
circumstances-the same kind of risk presented with an instruction
not to draw an inference.
The thinking would change, however, if the prosecutor, in
closing argument, raises the tailoring inference and invites the
jury to draw it. At that point, the adage of letting sleeping dogs lie
is no longer operable. As discussed above,' 7 ' the accused should, of
course, be permitted to introduce prior consistent statements to
respond to a tailoring inference raised by the prosecutor. This Part
discusses the procedural problem created by the need to introduce
prior consistent statements after the prosecution's closing argu-
ment.
In the normal course of trial proceedings, a defendant's (or other
witness's) prior consistent statements would be offered under Rule
801 (d) (1) (B), or for rehabilitation purposes, following a prosecutor's
attack launched during cross-examination.172 The impeached wit-
ness would likely never leave the stand and the statement would be
received, if admissible, before the close of evidence. 7 ' When a
prosecutor's accusation of tailoring is leveled during summation,
reception of rebuttal evidence presents courts with some procedural
171. See supra Part II.
172. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B).
173. This described procedure would likely be followed when a judge permits a defendant
to introduce a prior consistent statement of the type discussed here absent an impeaching
attack. See supra Part II.B.
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abnormalities. But such abnormalities can be-and routinely
are-accommodated. The Federal Rules of Evidence and relevant
case law provide judges with the tools and flexibility to do so.
According to the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of
Evidence, judges are best positioned to manage courtroom proce-
dures and therefore bear "ultimate responsibility for the effective
working of the adversary system."1 '4 Rule 611 recognizes the value
of judges' unique "feel" for the mechanics of trial proceedings and
affords them broad discretion to control and alter the order of
proof and to determine how and when evidence is presented.' 5
Judges are instructed to exercise their discretion in service of three
goals: (1) the effective ascertainment of the truth; (2) avoidance of
unnecessary delay; and (3) protection of witnesses from harassment
or undue embarrassment.'76 Although the usual order of introduc-
ing evidence and witnesses is presumed to achieve those goals, at
times deviation from that order is both necessary and desirable.1
77
Appellate courts have repeatedly upheld decisions of trial judges
to allow a witness whose credibility has been attacked to retake the
stand, 178 as well as decisions to permit a party to reopen its case to
present additional evidence. 179 Factors often considered in review
174. FED. R. EVID. 611(a) advisory committee's notes.
175. See FED. R. EVID. 611(a) ('The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode
and order of interrogating witnesses ....); see also 3 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, MICHAEL M.
MARTIN & DANIELJ. CAPRA, FEDERALRULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 611.02[1] (9th ed. 2006)
(stating that Rule 611 "permits the Trial Judge to allow or disallow changes in the order of
proof, rebuttal evidence, surrebuttal evidence, recall of witnesses, reopening of a case once
a party has rested, and many other requests that are made in the course of a trial").
176. See FED. R. EVID. 611(a).
177. See, e.g., Loinaz v. EG & G, Inc., 910 F.2d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that refusing
under Rule 611(a) to allow a party to present a witness out of turn was abuse of discretion
where credibility was an important factor in trial: "The dynamics of a party's presentation
may be compromised when the testimony of an opposing witness is allowed to interrupt that
presentation, but Rule 611 recognizes that such an alteration in order may be necessary at
times.").
178. See, e.g., United States v. Perry, 550 F.2d 524, 532 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that the
trial court had discretion to allow a prosecution witness to retake the stand to explain
inconsistencies in testimony elicited by defense counsel on cross-examination: 'The extent
to which counteracting and rehabilitative evidence may be received after the credibility of
a witness has been attacked is a matter in which the trial judge necessarily has broad
discretion.").
179. For reception of evidence after prosecution has rested, see, e.g., United States v.
Boone, 437 F.3d 829 (8th Cir. 2006) (allowing the prosecution to reopen its case-in-chief
immediately after resting to permit a previously unavailable alibi witness to testify). For
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ing the latter category of decisions include: (1) the timeliness of a
party's motion to reopen; (2) the nature of the evidence sought to be
introduced; (3) the effect of granting the motion; (4) the opposing
party's opportunity for rebuttal; and (5) the value to the jury of the
proffered evidence in ascertaining the guilt or innocence of the
accused.18 ° Taken together, and as applied to cases like Agard, the
balance of these factors weighs heavily in favor of allowing criminal
defendants to introduce prior consistent statements when the
prosecutor raises an inference of tailoring at summation.
Timeliness of defendant's motion: In a case where a defendant
intends to offer prior consistent statements to address a tailoring
charge only if one is specifically made by the prosecutor, defense
counsel could prepare a motion to reopen its case in the event that
the charge is made. To the extent that particulars would need to be
added to the motion following the prosecutor's comments (e.g., what
the prosecutor actually said), defense counsel could ask for a brief
recess to do so. Some courts also require a defendant to provide a
reasonable explanation for failing to make his motion earlier on
at trial.' Where, as here, the need for the motion is affected by
actions of the prosecution, a defendant should not be punished
because a prosecutor awaited closing arguments to level his
accusation.'82
reopening after close of evidence, see, e.g., United States v. Walker, 772 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir.
1985) (reversing trial court decision denying the defendant's request to reopen the case to
testify after close of evidence).
180. See Boone, 437 F.3d at 836-37 ("Where the government has been allowed to reopen,
the factors to be considered in reviewing that decision include whether the new evidence
caused surprise to the defendant, whether the defendant was given adequate opportunity to
rebut the new evidence, and whether the evidence was more detrimental to the defendant
than it otherwise might have been because of the order in which it was presented.");
United States v. Rouse, 111 F.3d 561, 573 (8th Cir. 1997) (' The relevant inquiry is whether
the evidence caused surprise to the defendant, whether he was given adequate opportunity
to meet the proof, and whether the evidence was more detrimental to him because of the
order in which it was introduced." (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)); Walker,
772 F.2d at 1177 ("In exercising its discretion, the court must consider the timeliness of the
motion, the character of the testimony, and the effect of the granting of the motion." (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted)).
181. Walker, 772 F.2d at 1177 ("The party moving to reopen should provide a reasonable
explanation for failure to present the evidence in its case-in-chief. The evidence proffered
should be relevant, admissible, technically adequate, and helpful to the jury in ascertaining
the guilt or innocence of the accused." (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).
182. Prior consistent statements are obviously pertinent to the credibility of the
defendant's testimony. Thus, the defendant's constitutional right to testify should buttress
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Effect of granting the motion: Two separate inquiries might be
undertaken in evaluating the effect of granting the motion: (1) How
much would granting the motion disrupt trial proceedings?; and
(2) What degree of prejudice would the prosecution suffer? With
regard to disruption, introduction of a single statement by the
defendant--even after summation has begun-should not cause
significant disruption to the trial, particularly given the probative
value of the statement when addressed to tailoring and the
frequency with which judges exercise their Rule 611 discretion to
cope with the peculiarities of individual cases. With regard to
prejudice to the government, a prosecutor could hardly claim
surprise or prejudice when his own comments opened the door to
rebuttal evidence.
Prosecution's opportunity for rebuttal: The prosecution would
need to be afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the defendant
with regard to the statement. If the prosecutor makes his accusa-
tion during his initial closing, the defendant's statement would be
introduced and the prosecutor could further comment on the
statement during rebuttal closing."18 If the prosecutor waits until
rebuttal closing to level his charge, it would be within the court's
discretion to allow the prosecutor to briefly address the jury
following introduction of the statement.
18 4
Value of the proffered evidence: A defendant's prior statement
that aligns with his trial testimony entirely negates the inference
that he tailored his testimony to meet that of the witnesses who
preceded him. In cases that are likely to turn on credibility-
precisely the sort discussed here-the jury's truth-finding process
boils down to deciding which witnesses it believes. Providing jurors
access to a defendant's pretrial statement that demonstrates his
testimonial consistency greatly enhances that process and could
have an enormous impact on the jury's ultimate determination of
guilt or innocence.
his right to reopen the case to offer additional evidence. See, e.g., Flynn v. State, 497 N.E.2d
912, 914 (Ind. 1986) (invoking a state constitutional right to testify).
183. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 29.1 ("Closing arguments proceed in the following order: (1) the
government argues; (2) the defense argues; and (3) the government rebuts.").
184. One might also argue that if the prosecutor waits until the very last minute to draw
an inference of tailoring, the court could fairly deny him an opportunity to comment-beyond
cross-examination--on a then-admitted prior consistent statement.
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In sum, in the ordinary case, the factors generally considered
pertinent to exercising judicial discretion to reopen the case cut
heavily in favor of permitting the defendant to reopen for the
limited purpose of addressing the government's tailoring argument
when raised in summation.
IV. THE EFFECTS ON DEFENSE STRATEGY OF PERMITTING
ADMISSION OF DEFENDANTS' PRETRIAL STATEMENTS
Despite the fact that overwhelming percentages of criminal
defendants plead guilty, defense counsel cannot know early in
every case whether it is one that will plead out or will go to trial.
Similarly, defense counsel cannot know with certainty whether, if
there is a trial, the defendant will testify. In cases in which a
defendant makes a strong protestation of innocence, defense
counsel might be well advised to consider whether and how to
create a pretrial statement for use at trial if the defendant does
take the stand.
Consider a case like Agard, for example. Assume that at the time
defense counsel confers with Ray Agard, he has not yet made any
statements about the matter that could potentially be used as
consistent statements. Defense counsel would know, however, that
Agard was arrested and charged with sexual assault and illegal use
of a firearm. Defense counsel would determine that because Agard
admitted he was present in his apartment when the events oc-
curred, he obviously has first-hand knowledge of the events and is
capable of relating his version of those events. It would be possible
for defense counsel to have Agard make a statement concerning
how the events occurred. Such a statement could take many forms.
It could be written and dated. It could be tape-recorded and dated.
It could be video-taped and dated. Defense counsel could choose a
format most likely to be impressive if the statement were used to
corroborate Agard at trial and to negate the inference that presence
at trial results in the tailoring of testimony.
A. To Whom Is the Statement Made?
Defense counsel could obtain the statement in the course of
interviewing the defendant, and the statement would be protected
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by the attorney-client privilege until disclosed through the defen-
dant at trial. Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.2, the
defense would not be required to produce any other statement of the
defendant in the possession of the defense.'85 Nevertheless, there is
a problem if the defendant's trial counsel takes the statement. Rule
26.2(f) defines a "statement" to cover written statements and
contemporaneously recorded recitals of oral statements. 8 6 Thus, a
defendant's unrecorded discussions about a case with counsel would
not qualify as statements protected by Rule 26.2 and would be
subject to disclosure. Moreover, the lack of a recording could mean
that defense counsel would become a potential witness, possibly
requiring his withdrawal from the representation. 87
A preferable approach would be for defense counsel to arrange for
the defendant to make a pretrial statement to another lawyer, who
would advise the defendant about the potential risks and benefits
of making such a statement. This second lawyer could also advise
the defendant as to the most desirable format for recording the
statement. If the defense chose to offer the pretrial statement at
trial, trial counsel would not be disqualified and would be able to
continue in the case. Even if a second lawyer is not involved, it
behooves counsel to have the statement properly recorded in order
to avoid a lawyer-witness problem.
185. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2(a) ("After a witness other than the defendant has testified
on direct examination, the court, on motion of a party who did not call the witness, must
order an attorney for the government or the defendant and the defendant's attorney to
produce, for the examination and use of the moving party, any statement of the witness that
is in their possession and that relates to the subject matter of the witness's testimony."
(emphasis added)).
186. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2(f)(1)-(3).
187. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7(a) (2007) (providing that, with some
limited exceptions, a lawyer "shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely
to be a necessary witness'); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-102(A) (1983)
(providing that, with some limited exceptions, when "a lawyer learns or it is obvious that he
or a lawyer in his firm ought to be called as a witness on behalf of his client, he shall
withdraw from the conduct of the trial").
For a case raising a lawyer-witness problem when defense counsel was privy to, but did
not record, a pretrial statement, see United States v. Kliti, 156 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 1998)
(reversing a conviction because the lawyer-witness problem resulted in a violation of the
defendant's right to conflict-free counsel).
2028 [Vol. 49:1991
2008] UNRECOGNIZED RIGHT OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
B. The Impact on Discovery
Aside from proving that the defendant made a pretrial statement,
the defense may want to prove that the defendant's statement was
made before the prosecution shared discovery with the defense.
Particularly important would be evidence that the defendant's
pretrial statement was made prior to the time that either defense
counsel or the defendant had been provided with statements of the
government's witnesses. That timing is of course critical to the
probative value of a prior consistent statement in rebutting an
inference of tailoring.
There are two points that the defense will need to make in
negating the inference the Supreme Court found so powerful in
Agard. The defense will need to show that: (1) the defendant made
a statement prior to trial that was consistent with trial testimony,
and (2) the pretrial statement was made prior to any access to the
statements of government witnesses, either informally or in
discovery. The first showing tends to rebut the inference that the
defendant's testimony was tailored to respond to the government
witnesses' trial testimony. The second showing tends to rebut any
inference that the defendant might have tailored his testimony to
pretrial disclosure (formal or informal) of the government's case.
The end result might be pressure on the prosecution to provide
pretrial discovery earlier and more completely than is now the case
in many jurisdictions."'8 The decision in Agard, although permitting
prosecutorial comment on a defendant's presence at trial, might be
much more significant in opening the door to pretrial statements
prepared by a defendant and to making the government pay a price
for withholding or delaying discovery-i.e., the loss of the inference
of tailoring.
188. Because the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and all state jurisdictions impose
some reciprocal discovery obligations, a defendant might reasonably be concerned that his
statement would be available to the prosecution pretrial and thereby give away the defense's
theory of the case. It is difficult, however, to imagine how a defendant could be compelled to
disclose a pretrial statement of the type discussed here. A defendant's statements to his
attorney are exempt from disclosure under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(b)(2)(B)(i),
and those statements are protected by the attorney-client privilege.
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V. POST-AGARD TRIAL EXAMPLES
Several examples may help to illustrate what defense counsel
might be able to do after Agard to neutralize prosecutorial sugges-
tions that a defendant has manipulated his testimony to respond to
the government's evidence.
A. Tailoring in Response to Pretrial Discovery
In State v. Miller, the Washington Court of Appeals affirmed a
defendant's convictions on two counts of first degree murder. 189 In
the State's rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor argued that
Miller "had the opportunity to read this discovery for 18 months,
that he had the opportunity to hear what every witness said,
and that he had the opportunity to tailor his story to fit the
evidence after he heard it all." 9 ° Miller challenged the fairness of
the argument, but the court of appeals concluded that "Miller has
offered no reason for characterizing the argument as misconduct
in his case except for the rationale rejected in Portuondo. Therefore,
it is not a basis for reversal."''
The court of appeals recognized that a tailoring argument can be
made with respect to access to pretrial material as well as to
exposure to trial testimony.'92 If the prosecutor is entitled to make
the argument and a jury is entitled to draw these inferences as
to tailoring, then fairness requires that a defendant be permitted
to offer a pretrial statement that predated discovery; admission of
such a statement is necessary to rebut the inferences that the
defendant tailored his testimony to information learned in either
discovery or trial testimony. It is difficult to see how the prosecutor
could make the argument made in Miller if the defendant had
recorded a pretrial statement that was consistent with his trial
testimony, and the recordation came before the prosecution pro-
vided the defense with discovery.
189. 40 P.3d 692, 693 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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B. Comparing the Defendant and Other Witnesses
In State v. Alexander, the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld a
prosecutor's argument that compared a defendant to every other
witness.193 The prosecutor argued as follows:
Who is best able to fabricate a complicated story designed to
sway a jury? Your final decision must ultimately be based on
whom you believe. The victim ... or the defendant.... Now, you
may recall that all the witnesses were sequestered. And, that
was so they couldn't hear what the other witnesses were saying
so they couldn't tailor their testimony to each other's testimony.
So that they couldn't contradict each other. But there was one
witness who wasn't sequestered. There was one witness who
heard everything. And, that was [the defendant], who has a
built-in bias in the outcome of this case by virtue of the fact that
he's the defendant. 9 4
In rebuttal to the defendant's closing argument, the prosecutor
added: "When you consider the credibility of the defendant's
testimony, keep in mind that of all the witnesses here, he's the most
obviously biased and interested one. He's the one who has the
motive to distort the truth and fabricate the story. Think about
it."195
One problem with the argument was that the witnesses were not
sequestered, although the State represented to the state supreme
court during oral argument that witnesses other than the defendant
were not present during other testimony.'96 The court apparently
accepted the State's representation and found the case indistin-
guishable from Agard: "We conclude that the prosecutor's comments
in the present case, which are nearly indistinguishable from those
in Portuondo, do not infringe on the defendant's fifth or sixth
amendment rights."'97
As in Miller, a recorded pretrial statement would largely negate
a prosecutor's attempt to compare a defendant, who remains in the
193. 755 A.2d 868, 872 (Conn. 2000).
194. Id. (footnote omitted).
195. Id.
196. See id. at 872 n.7.
197. Id. at 874.
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courtroom at all times, with witnesses who are sequestered. The
only point of such an argument is that the defendant has the unique
opportunity to tailor testimony. If a pretrial statement demon-
strates that the defendant's version of the facts was recorded before
trial and without knowledge of what witnesses would testify to, that
statement is a powerful refutation of the prosecutor's argument.
The importance of a pretrial statement may increase when a
prosecutor combines two arguments: (1) the defendant has a unique
opportunity to tailor testimony to fit that of other witnesses and
evidence, and (2) the defendant is the only witness in a criminal
case who has an interest in the outcome and is, therefore, the only
witness with a clear bias. The combination of the two arguments
suggests that the defendant has both motive and opportunity to
tailor testimony. Alexander is just such a case. In these cases, the
probative value of the consistent statement is even higher than in
an ordinary case in which a simple tailoring argument is made;
accordingly the case for admission of a prior consistent statement
is even stronger under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.
C. Capital Cases
In Hooks v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
affirmed Hooks's convictions on five counts of first degree murder
and five death sentences, after the prosecutor raised a tailoring
inference in closing argument.19 The court cited Agard and simply
said:
Hooks next complains the prosecutor should not have argued in
closing that Hooks's presence at trial allowed him to hear the
State's evidence and then create a story to fit it. The United
States Supreme Court recently found this argument was not an
impermissible comment on a defendant's right to testify, or an
infringement on his right to confront witnesses or on the
requirement he be present at trial. Given this precedent we
decline to find error.199
It is clear that the tailoring inference is available to jurors in
every type of trial, including capital cases. It is also clear that,
198. 19 P.3d 294, 315 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001).
199. Id. (footnote omitted).
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unless state law restricts prosecutors in making arguments,
prosecutors are entitled to argue that a defendant in a capital case
tailored testimony to fit the case. When the stakes are the highest,
if the defense is contesting guilt, the preparation-and admission
by the court-of a consistent pretrial statement is particularly
important.
D. Attacking the Defense
In some cases the prosecutor may attack the defense rather than
focus exclusively on the defendant's testimony. Thus, the prosecutor
may argue that the defense had an opportunity to tailor testimony
because it did not put on its evidence, including the defendant's
testimony, until the completion of the prosecution's case. A good
example is Williams v. State,2 °° where the following exchange
occurred:
Prosecutor: Now, in civil cases, a pleading is filed, a complaint,
a petition. An answer is filed. And the plaintiffs attorney goes
through that answer and he says, gee, I allege this, they admit
it. I allege that, they admit it. I allege that, they deny it. They
deny it. In criminal cases, the state finds out what the defense[s]
[are] at trial....
Defense Attorney: Objection. Once again, that's a misstatement
of the law.
The Court: Overruled. Go ahead[.]
Prosecutor: We find out, other than a very broad picture of what
the defense is, we find out exactly who the witnesses are going
to be, we find out what they're going to say, we find out at trial
what the evidence that the defendant puts on in large part is
going to be. And what the defendant does in large part is, and
the reason I think this is, the defendant sees what case we have
and then they have the freedom to adapt their case to it. Do you
remember day before yesterday, I asked to admit these things
into evidence and went through the chain of custody showing
who had handled them. [And the defense attorney objected
saying] we haven't heard from the ...
200. No. A-7688, 2002 Alas. App. LEXIS 26 (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2002).
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Defense Attorney: Objection. I want to approach.
[Bench conference as follows:]
Defense Attorney: I'm asking for a mistrial. He is getting into if
I object to something. I have a right to object to it if I have a
good faith argument. And now he's coming and denying this.
And he's going beyond the scope. He's getting into issues that
are attacks on me and attacks on the defendant. I want a
mistrial. It's been continuing.
The Court: Well, I'm not going to grant a mistrial but don't you
think that's just (indiscernible), you know, critiquing his
defense?
Prosecutor: Your Honor, just for the purposes of the record,
they're not personal attacks. I'm not critiquing his defense. I'm
doing it because I think that it shows the weaknesses in the
portions of the case where they carry the burden.
The Court: I have a tendency to disagree with you. I think you
have used enough of that particular argument, so ...
Prosecutor: Fair enough.
The Court: ... move on.
201
The defendant argued that the prosecutor's assertion that the
defense was tailored violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights." 2 But the court, relying on Agard, found no infirmity in the
prosecutor's argument.2 °3
The defendant in Williams argued that Agard was distinguish-
able because the prosecutor's argument went to the integrity of the
entire defense.2 °4 A concurring judge, however, explained that the
defense's attempt to distinguish Agard failed:
According to Williams, the important difference in his case is
that the prosecutor was attacking the credibility of a defense
201. Id. at **8-10.
202. Id. at **15-16 (Mannheimer, J., concurring).
203. Id. at *16.
204. Id. at *17.
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theory, not the credibility of a defense witness. This is an
arguable distinction, but it is not clear that this difference leads
to a different legal result. Williams cites no case which relies on
this purported distinction to disapprove a prosecutor's summa-
tion.2 °5
An argument like that made in Williams attacks both the
defendant and defense counsel, and challenges the credibility of
both. A recorded pretrial consistent statement would blunt the
attack on counsel as well as the attack on the defendant; accord-
ingly, the case for its admission is compelling under Federal Rule
of Evidence 403.
E. Prior Inconsistent Statements
Both Justice Ginsburg in dissent in Agard and the Second Circuit
majority would distinguish generic attacks on a defendant's pres-
ence at trial from arguments based on some specific indication that
the defendant may have tailored his testimony. 2° 6 For example, if
a defendant made a statement to police after an arrest that was
inconsistent with trial testimony, presumably Justice Ginsburg and
the Second Circuit would permit a prosecutor to comment on the
defendant's presence and to suggest that the defendant tailored
testimony as a result of hearing the government's evidence.
When the defendant has made an inconsistent statement, what
is the role of a statement consistent with trial testimony when the
prosecutor makes a specific tailoring argument? If the defendant is
going to trial despite having made a statement to the police and is
going to testify, presumably the defense believes it can explain
away the statement to the police. In such circumstances, a pretrial
statement may be just as useful to negate the tailoring charge as in
the cases described above.2 °v This is because a prior consistent
statement is admissible to rehabilitate a witness's credibility if it
explains an inconsistency.2 °8 For example, if the defendant makes
205. Id.
206. Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 88 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
207. See supra Parts V.C-D.
208. See, e.g., United States v. Pierre, 781 F.2d 329, 331 (2d Cir. 1986) ("Another example
of a prior consistent statement with significant rebutting force is a statement offered to
clarify or amplify the meaning of the impeaching inconsistent statement. In such
circumstances we have allowed use of the prior consistent statement under the doctrine of
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an incriminating statement to the police, he may want to argue at
trial that he made the statement because he was under duress or
confused. A pretrial statement made outside of custodial circum-
stances-consistent with in-court testimony-may help to explain
the inconsistency that is being addressed by the defendant at trial.
In such cases, the consistent statement serves to rehabilitate the
defendant on two counts: it explains the inconsistency, and it rebuts
the argument that the defendant's trial testimony was tailored to
developments at the trial. Again, under Rule 403, the case for
admitting such a prior consistent statement is that much stronger.
F. When Comment Is Prohibited
Some states prohibit the prosecutor from making a generic
attack on a defendant's credibility by arguing that presence at
trial provided an opportunity for tailoring. In State v. Daniels, for
example, the New Jersey Supreme Court distinguished between
tailoring arguments that are generic and those that are addressed
to specific indications of possible tailoring by the defendant. 20 9 The
court held, as an exercise of its supervisory authority, that generic
tailoring arguments would be barred but case-specific tailoring
arguments were permissible. 2" The court reasoned as follows:
We agree with Justice Stevens that generic accusations of
tailoring debase the "truth-seeking function of the adversary
process," violate the "respect for the defendant's individual
dignity," and ignore "the presumption of innocence that survives
until a guilty verdict is returned." We simply cannot conclude
that generic accusations are a legitimate means to bring about
a just conviction." Therefore, pursuant to our supervisory
authority, we hold that prosecutors are prohibited from making
generic accusations of tailoring during summation.
When a prosecutor makes specific accusations of tailoring,
however, we apply a different analysis. If there is evidence of
tailoring, beyond the fact that the defendant was simply present
at the trial and heard the testimony of other witnesses, a
prosecutor may comment, but in a limited fashion. The prosecu-
tor's comments must be based on the evidence in the record and
completeness." (citing United States v. Fayette, 388 F.2d 728, 733-35 (2d Cir. 1968))).
209. 861 A.2d 808, 819 (N.J. 2004).
210. Id.
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the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Moreover, the
prosecutor may not refer explicitly to the fact that the defendant
was in the courtroom or that he heard the testimony of other
witnesses, and was thus able to tailor his testimony. In all such
circumstances, we expect that prosecutors will act in good
faith.2 11
If a court bars generic tailoring arguments-or goes even further
and exercises its discretion to bar all tailoring arguments-does
this mean that consistent pretrial statements by the defendant are
also barred? We think not. The fact remains that a jury may draw
its own inference of tailoring even without a prosecutor suggesting
that it do so, generically or specifically. The probability of the jury
drawing such an inference, no matter what, was the linchpin of
Justice Scalia's analysis in Agard.212 Thus, even in jurisdictions that
forbid prosecutors from arguing that presence provides an opportu-
nity for tailoring, the defendant has a genuine need to offer
evidence to negate the inference. A pretrial statement may be as
useful in New Jersey and similar jurisdictions as in jurisdictions
that permit prosecutorial argument regarding presence.213
211. Id. (internal citations omitted).
212. Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 68 n.1 (2000).
213. The New Jersey Supreme Court disagreed with Justice Ginsburg, Agard, 529 U.S.
at 78 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), and found that cross-examination of a defendant suggesting
that presence in the courtroom resulted in tailored testimony was as prohibited as arguing
about presence in summation:
Although not raised by defendant at trial or before this Court, we recognize that
both trial courts and litigants may have questions as to whether, and to what
extent, our opinion concerning prosecutorial summation applies to cross-
examination by the State. For future guidance, the same analysis that we have
provided for summations applies also to cross-examination. The foundational
principle in that framework is that a prosecutor must have "reasonable
grounds" for posing questions during cross-examination that impugn a witness's
credibility. Beyond that, if there is evidence in the record that a defendant
tailored his testimony, the prosecutor may cross-examine the defendant based
on that evidence. However, at no time during cross-examination may the
prosecutor reference the defendant's attendance at trial or his ability to hear
the testimony of preceding witnesses.
Daniels, 861 A.2d at 820 (internal citation omitted).
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CONCLUSION
Looking back to the Second Circuit's opinion in Agard v.
Portuondo, Judge Winter appears to have been right when he
reasoned in concurrence:
[Tihe inference [of tailoring] suggested by the prosecutor was
entirely unfair in that appellant had no chance to anticipate and
rebut it by testimony. Under New York law, absent a claim of
recent fabrication, appellant could not have introduced evidence
of prior consistent statements-that is, evidence that he had
told the same story even before witnessing the prosecution's
case.
214
We believe that comments like those by the prosecutor in Agard
should open the door to admission of rebuttal evidence-specifically
prior consistent statements of the type previously discussed under
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) and its state analogues.
However, the concern raised by Judge Winter is equally applicable
to criminal defendants who face the same damaging inference even
though not drawn by the prosecutor. Judge Winter's solution was
to bar the kind of argument or comment made in Agard. But even
had the Supreme Court followed Judge Winter's lead, that solution
would have proven inadequate because the jury would have been
free to draw, and according to Justice Scalia would have drawn, the
inference suggested by the prosecutor on its own. Now that the
Supreme Court has recognized the power of the inference, the
correct solution is to permit defendants to introduce relevant,
probative evidence (e.g., a recorded pretrial statement that tracks
their trial testimony), notwithstanding the content of the prosecu-
tor's summation. Admitting consistent statements made by the
defendant before trial is well within the evidence rules: the hearsay
rule poses no bar because the pretrial statement is offered only to
rehabilitate credibility, not for truth,21 and the statement is clearly
probative to negate an inference of tailoring.21
214. Agard v. Portuondo, 117 F.3d 696, 715 (2d Cir. 1997) (Winter, J., concurring).
215. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (defining hearsay).
216. See FED. R. EvID. 401 (defining the basic relevancy requirement).
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In Agard, all nine Justices agreed that the central function of a
trial is to discover the truth.217 Whether or not allowing the
prosecutor to draw an inference of tailoring advances that function,
admission of a defendant's recorded pretrial statement that
demonstrates his testimonial consistency most certainly does. The
Federal Rules of Evidence are designed to facilitate the adversarial
process's search for truth, and should be so interpreted,218 as should
state counterparts. Evidence rules that bar defendants from
offering prior consistent statements of the sort discussed here both
impede the truth-seeking process and prevent defendants from
offering a full and fair defense.219
217. See Agard, 529 U.S. at 73 ("[Ihe central function of the trial ... is to discover the
truth."); id. at 76 (Stevens, J., concurring) (discussing "the truth-seeking function of the
adversary process"); id. at 77 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("A trial ideally is a search for the
truth ....").
218. FED. R. EVID. 102 ('CThese rules shall be construed to secure fairness in
administration ... to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly
determined.").
219. The remedy we propose for criminal defendants in this Article stems from the fact
that they cannot be sequestered. There are also certain government witnesses who cannot
be sequestered, and it may be that the government would argue for a similar remedy as to
those witnesses. The attorney for the government is allowed to designate a representative
who will be free from sequestration, FED. R. EVID. 615(2), and that will often be the case
agent who will testify. Also, Federal Rule of Evidence 615(3) does not permit exclusion of"a
person whose presence is shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of the party's
cause." This subdivision has been read to exempt case agents (other than the one designated
under Rule 615(2)) from sequestration under certain circumstances. See United States v.
Phibbs, 999 F.2d 1053 (6th Cir. 1993). Finally, victims who will testify are protected from
sequestration in most instances. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2000).
Whether the government could admit consistent pretrial statements of these non-
sequestered government witnesses would depend on the circumstances. Admission of a
pretrial statement would depend on (1) whether the case agent actually sat through all the
testimony before testifying-because if the case agent comes and goes, she is not in the same
situation as the defendant; (2) whether the testimony is actually corroborative of rather than
independent of other witnesses--for example, an agent who merely supervised a wiretap
might have nothing to say that is based on what other witnesses said; (3) the sequencing of
witnesses-the earlier in the trial the case agent testifies, the weaker is the inference of
tailoring and so the less probative is the pretrial statement; and (4) the obviousness of the
witness's presence throughout the trial-the jury will surely be aware of the defendant's
continual presence, but it is questionable whether the same degree of awareness will be
attached to case agents and especially victims, who are not seated at counsel's table. Trial
courts are well-equipped to consider all of these factors under the circumstances to determine
the strength of a tailoring inference, and can balance the probative value of the pretrial
statement against its prejudicial effect under Rule 403.

